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Abstract
We study large markets with a single seller which can produce many types of goods,
and many multi-minded buyers. The seller chooses posted prices for its many items, and
the buyers purchase bundles to maximize their utility. For this setting, we consider the
following questions: What fraction of the optimum social welfare does a revenue maximizing
solution achieve? Are there pricing mechanisms which achieve both good revenue and good
welfare simultaneously? To address these questions, we give efficient pricing schemes which
are guaranteed to result in both good revenue and welfare, as long as the buyer valuations for
the goods they desire have a nice (although reasonable) structure, e.g., that the aggregate
buyer demand has a monotone hazard rate or is not too convex. We also show that our
pricing schemes have implications for any pricing which achieves high revenue: specifically
that even if the seller cares only about revenue, they can still ensure that their prices result
in good social welfare without sacrificing profit. Our results holds for general multi-minded
buyers in large markets; we also provide improved guarantees for the important special case
of unit-demand buyers.
1 Introduction
Social Welfare and Profit 1 are the two canonical objectives in the extensive literature dealing
with envy-free algorithmic pricing. The study of these two objectives, in isolation from each
other, has inspired the design of novel pricing mechanisms for revenue maximization [5, 21] in
a variety of interesting markets, and an equally impressive body of work on welfare maximiza-
tion [13, 18, 23]. While the significance of profit and social welfare is undisputed, it is easy to
overlook the fact the two objectives do not exist in a vacuum. For instance, although a monop-
olistic seller may only be interested in profits, myopically increasing prices while compromising
on buyer welfare can lead to poor long-term revenue. This is distinctly true for large markets
with repeated engagement where singularly optimizing for one objective while ignoring the other
(as in the existing literature) could adversely affect the health of the marketplace [4]. Therefore,
not only is it desirable to promote the design of holistic pricing solutions that optimize on both
counts simultaneously, it is also crucial to gain a better understanding of how existing algorithms
perform in a bicriteria sense. Against this backdrop, we seek to address the following questions.
What fraction of the optimum social welfare does a revenue maximizing solution
achieve? Are there pricing mechanisms which achieve both good revenue and good
welfare simultaneously?
1For convenience, we will use revenue and profit interchangeably in this work
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Both in economics and in computer science [26], it is well understood that the goals of
maximizing revenue and social welfare are often at odds with each other. Bearing this in mind,
we seek to quantify the exact amount of friction between these two objectives in large markets.
In particular, we are interested in understanding the surplus achieved by a profit maximizing
solution, a problem that has received considerable attention in Auction theory [1, 20, 26]. The
fact that we restrict our attention to the revenue end of the spectrum is motivated partly by
the observation that welfare maximizing prices can result in negligible profits (see Example 3.1)
even for trivial instances. However, unlike most analogous work in the theory of auctions, we
are interested in understanding these trade-offs as well as designing bicriteria approximation
algorithms in multi-item markets where the seller’s modus operandi involves posting prices on
the individual goods. In that sense, this work is a high-level extension of the recent body of
work on envy-free revenue-maximization [3, 8, 21] towards additional ambitious objectives.
1.1 Market Model: Item Pricing for Multi-Minded Buyers
In this work, we adopt a simple posted-pricing mechanism that captures the operation of most
real-life large markets: the seller posts a single price per good, and each buyer purchases a
bundle of goods that maximizes their utility. The seller controls a set T of available goods, and
can produce any desired quantity xt of a good t ∈ T , for which he incurs a cost of Ct(xt). The
market consists of many, many buyers who are multi-minded, meaning that each buyer i has a
‘desired set of bundles of goods’: the buyer has the same value vi for each of these bundles and
under a given set of prices, purchases the bundle that maximizes her utility.
The market model that we study in this work is reasonably general. Multi-minded buyers
represent a class of computationally attractive yet combinatorially non-trivial buyer valuations
that have recently been featured in a number of papers [10, 27]. Perhaps, more importantly,
the class strictly generalizes highly popular models such as unit-demand and single-minded
valuations. Secondly, the convex production costs considered in our framework strictly generalize
models with limited (or unlimited) supply, which are usually the norm in the pricing literature.
As [3,7] point out, limited supply is often too rigid for realistic, large markets where the seller may
be able to increase production, albeit at a higher cost. Bicriteria algorithms notwithstanding,
our work actually presents the first profit-maximization algorithms for general multi-minded
buyers even with limited supply.
Our model captures several scenarios of interest wherein a typically profit maximizing seller
may be driven to ensure good overall social utility. We illustrate two of them here.
1. PEV Charging: In a market capturing charging stations for plug-in electric vehicles, each
good represents a time slot, and each buyer may desire specific (sets of) time slots based on
time constraints and charging capacity. Varying demand and electricity generation costs
necessitate differential pricing across time slots [6, 32].
2. Advertising Markets: A publisher in such a market may decide to use simultaneous
posted prices to auction off a set of distinct ad-items (positions or locations on the website)
to buyers interested in purchasing specific subsets of these items to reach target audiences.
Circumventing Computational Complexity via Oblivious Guarantees
One of the challenges in essentially any non-trivial setting (including all the settings which we
consider), is that computing profit-maximizing prices is NP-Hard. This is largely due to the
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fact that the seller is not allowed to price-discriminate, i.e., it must charge the same price for
each good to all the buyers, instead of having different prices for each buyer. In view of the
computational barriers surrounding the optimal profit solution, a seller which cares about profit
may use a variety of strategies, from approximation algorithms to heuristics. The uncertainty
regarding the actual strategy adopted by the seller in turn casts aspersions on the practical
significance of our goal of characterizing the social welfare at optimal-revenue solutions. One of
the contributions of this work is a simple but powerful framework that allows us to completely
circumvent the complexity question: our guarantees on the social welfare do not depend on the
exact details of the pricing mechanism used by the seller, and instead would hold for a wide
variety of pricing mechanisms, as long as these prices achieve decent revenue guarantees.
Inverse Demand Functions and α-Strong Regularity
In order to concisely represent the large number of buyers in the market, we classify the buyers
into a finite set of buyer types B such that all of the multi-minded buyers belonging to a certain
type desire the same set of bundles. Then, each buyer type can be fully captured by a subset of
2T along with an inverse demand distribution λi(x) describing the valuations of buyers having
this type. Formally, for any buyer type i ∈ B, λi(x) = p implies exactly x amount of buyers
of type i have a valuation of p or more for each bundle in their common desired set. Although
different buyer types may have different demand functions, it is natural to assume that the
valuations of all buyers are often sampled (albeit differently) from some global distribution.
Because of this, we will make the assumption that the buyer valuations for every type have the
same support [λmin, λmax].
A first stab at the problem reveals that the above framework is too coarse to obtain mean-
ingful trade-offs between social welfare and profit. Indeed, it is not hard to reason that a precise
characterization of the revenue-welfare trade-offs would depend heavily on the distributions of
the buyer valuations. To better understand this dependence, we study a class of inverse de-
mand functions parameterized by a single parameter α ∈ [0, 1] known as α-strongly regular
distributions.
Definition (α-Strong Regularity [16]) A buyer type i is said to have an α-Strongly regular
demand function (α-SR) for α ∈ [0, 1] if for any x1 < x2, we have λi(x2)|λ′i(x2)| −
λi(x1)
|λ′i(x1)| ≤ α(x2− x1).
α-Strongly regular distributions were introduced in [16] as a strict generalization of monotone
hazard rate (MHR) distributions that smoothly interpolate between MHR (α = 0) and regular
distributions (α = 1). Our main contribution is the design of mechanisms that simultaneously
obtain good revenue and welfare for small α, and degrade gracefully as α increases. Note that
even the set of α-SR functions with α = 0, for which we obtain the strongest results, contains
a large class of important distributions, including exponential (e.g., e−x), polynomial (e.g.,
1 − x2), and all log-concave functions. The reader is asked to refer to Section 2 for a more
detailed discussion regarding this class of distributions.
1.2 Our Contributions
The primary algorithmic contribution of this work is a new (profit, welfare)-bicriteria approxi-
mation for general markets with multi-minded buyers and production costs, stated below.
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(a) Exact bounds for profit and welfare as a
function of α for unit-demand buyers. We ob-
tain constant-factor bicriteria approximations
when the demand is close to MHR (α = 0),
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(b) Actual Revenue-Welfare Curve for unit-
demand buyers, α = 0: The exact bicriteria
guarantees lie on the trade-off curve, so that
one of the two approximation factors is signifi-
cantly better than the worst-case bound (point
X). For example, when welfare is only half-
optimal, the revenue factor improves from 2e
to 2.
(Informal Theorem). We can compute in poly-time a set of item prices that guarantee a
(Θ( log ∆1−α ))-approximation to the optimum profit, and a Θ(
1
1−α)-approximation for welfare, where
∆ is the ratio of the size of the largest bundle desired by any buyer to the smallest one.
There are several exciting aspects to this result: (i) Not only do we present the only-known
bi-criteria approximation algorithm for such general markets, but ours is also the first non-
trivial profit-maximization algorithm for multi-minded buyers in the envy-free literature. (ii)
Our welfare guarantees are completely independent of the bundle size (∆). (iii) When buyers
desire small bundles (e.g., for unit-demand valuations where all bundles are unit-size), our
solution extracts a constant portion of the social welfare as revenue, as illustrated in Figure 1(a).
Moreover, for the important special case of unit-demand valuations, we provide a much simpler
pricing mechanism with slightly better constant approximation factors than in the theorem
statement. (iv) Finally, even when buyers desire large bundles, it is reasonable to expect that in
markets with similar types of goods, the various bundles are of approximately the same size, i.e.,
∆ is small. In the PEV example, one expects different electric vehicles to have similar charging
capacity. This case with similar-sized bundles is a considerably non-trivial instance for which
the revenue-welfare gap becomes small.
Profit-Welfare Trade-Offs: The approximation guarantees in the theorem statement are
only the worst-case bounds derived independently for each objective. In fact, as illustrated in
Figure 1(b), we prove that the two worst-case factors never occur simultaneously and the actual
bicriteria bound lies on a trade-off curve, resulting in improved approximations for at least one
objective, i.e., if the actual welfare is close to the worst-case guarantee, then the profit is much
better than in the theorem and vice-versa.
Social Welfare of other Revenue-Maximizing Solutions
All of the revenue guarantees in this paper are shown by comparing the profit of our solution
to the optimum welfare, an approach that has strong implications towards bounding the social
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welfare of other profit-maximizing solutions. Specifically, we design a simple framework using
our bicriteria bounds as a black-box result and show that any pricing mechanism which achieves
revenue better than our (efficiently computable) mechanism is guaranteed to deliver at least
a Θ( log ∆1−α )-approximation to the optimum welfare. This holds whether the seller computes
revenue-maximizing prices (an NP-Hard problem even for unit-demand with α = 0), or uses a
more efficient mechanism. Thus, one of the main messages of this paper is that even a seller
interested solely in maximizing profits can guarantee a good social welfare without sacrificing
any revenue. For example, in unit-demand markets with MHR valuations, there is absolutely
no excuse for such a seller to not also achieve at least a 2e-approximation to the optimum social
welfare irrespective of their preferred pricing mechanism.
Technical Difficulties: Although our large market model falls in the realm of settings where
it is possible to efficiently compute social welfare maximizing prices, exploiting this for profit-
maximization as in [5,14,21] leads to poor approximation guarantees, for e.g., O(λ
max
λmin
)-bounds
even for unit-demand instances with no production costs. Instead, our techniques rely cru-
cially on exploiting the structure of α-strong regular functions to efficiently compute prices that
compromise neither on revenue nor welfare; following this, we also develop new computational
insights for characterizing profit via ascending-price procedures in settings with multi-minded
buyers and production costs. Finally, in this work, we will focus solely on deterministic pricing
mechanisms. While randomized mechanisms that mix between welfare and profit maximizing
solutions are a theoretically fascinating apparatus, the ensuing price fluctuations and alternating
buyer dissatisfaction render them unsuitable for many settings of interest [19,28]
Related Work: Existing Bicriteria Algorithms
The primary barrier towards designing envy-free revenue-maximizing prices — a lack of insight
regarding the optimum solution — is also, surprisingly, the chief architect behind the existence
of many (implicit) bi-criteria approximation algorithms in the algorithmic pricing literature.
More concretely, a majority of the revenue-maximization algorithms in the literature [5, 9, 12,
14, 21, 25] achieve their approximation factors for revenue by comparing it to the optimum
social welfare. Exploiting these revenue-welfare ties further, it is not hard to see that such
an α-approximation algorithm for revenue trivially results in a (α, α)-bicriteria approximation.
For instance, the results from [21] and [5] immediately imply (Θ(log |B|),Θ(log |B|))-bicriteria
approximation algorithms for unit-demand and unlimited supply markets respectively.
Our results improve upon the work mentioned above across multiple dimensions. In contrast
to the trivial (α, α) type bounds in previous work, our specific focus on bicriteria approximations
leads to significant improvements in social welfare without sacrificing much profit. We also
remark that while specific bicriteria bounds were also provided in [3], their results only apply
to the easiest version of our setting (α = 0,∆ = 1). Indeed, we study general settings with
multi-minded buyers and production costs, instead of unit-demand and single-mined valuations
with limited supply, which are much more common in algorithmic pricing literature. Finally,
our bounds are more nuanced due to their dependence on α, and independence from |B|, e.g.,
Θ(log |B|)-bounds are totally unacceptable for large markets.
1.3 Other Related Work
While (revenue,welfare)-bicriteria approximation algorithms have not specifically been tackled
in the pricing literature beyond the single good case, the broader understanding of trade-offs
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between the two objectives has been a prominent motif that has cropped up time and again
in various forms. We first highlight a few overarching differences between our results and
other work on profit-welfare trade-offs, specifically in auctions: (i) we study reasonably gen-
eral combinatorial markets with multi-minded buyers and production cost functions, and not
just limited-supply settings with unit-demand buyers as in other work, (ii) our results do not
depend on externalities such as tuning the objective function or the addition of external buyers
as in Bulow-Klemperer type theorems [2,11,30], and finally (iii) unlike similar (types of) results
in Bayesian auctions, our pricing mechanisms are non-discriminatory, and therefore, envy-free.
Characterizing the efficiency of revenue-optimal mechanisms is an extremely fundamental
question that has spurred multiple avenues of research starting with Bulow and Klemperer’s
seminal result [11] that adding a single buyer is usually more profitable than blindly optimiz-
ing revenue. Most pertinent to the questions posed in this work are the tight bounds on the
(in)efficiency of the Myerson revenue-maximizing mechanism for single good settings appearing
in [1, 26]: in particular, [26] provides welfare bounds for general single-parameter auctions as a
function of the distribution of buyer valuations, as we do in this work.
Moving beyond welfare lower bounds, other researchers have adopted a more constructive
approach by designing explicitly taking into account both the objectives either via bicriteria
mechanisms [17, 31], or by optimizing linear combinations of revenue and welfare [28], or even
characterizing the revenue-welfare Pareto curve [19]. We reiterate that all of the above papers
consider simple single good settings, which are easier to characterize, and where the revenue-
optimal mechanism is well understood. Moreover, in comparison to the revenue-welfare Pareto
curves in [19], the implicit trade-off curves in our work are of a different nature as they are ob-
tained for a single instance on top of the worst-case bounds. Finally, multi-objective trade-offs
are quite popular in the Sponsored Search literature [4, 18, 29, 30], where the repeated engage-
ment and the tight competition (between sellers) necessitates approximately revenue-optimal
mechanisms that do not compromise on overall social welfare. Such settings can essentially be
viewed as a special case of unit-demand markets.
2 Model and Preliminaries
Our market model comprises of a single seller controlling a set T of goods and a large number of
infinitesimal buyers. The buyers can be concisely represented using a finite set of multi-minded
buyer types B: for a given type i ∈ B, all the buyers having this type desire the same set of item
bundles Bi ⊆ 2T , and each buyer is indifferent between the bundles in Bi. Notice that when
all of the desired bundles are of unit cardinality, our model reduces to the unit-demand case;
when each buyer type desires only a single bundle (|Bi| = 1), we get single-minded valuations.
For general multi-minded valuations, we also assume the free disposal property. Finally, buyers
belonging to the same type may hold different valuations for the same bundles, this is modeled
by way of an inverse demand function λi(x) for every i ∈ B; λi(x) = p implies that exactly x
amount of buyers of type i value the bundles in Bi at valuation p or more. Given λi(x) = p, it
is not hard to see that the total utility derived when x amount of buyers purchase some bundle
at price p is ui(x) =
∫ x
z=0 λi(z)dz.
The market operates according to a natural pricing mechanism with the seller posting a
price pt for each good t ∈ T . Buyers purchase one of the utility-maximizing bundles available
to them, i.e., a buyer belonging to type i will purchase the cheapest bundle in Bi as long as its
price is no larger than her valuation for the same. Therefore, if p¯i denotes the bundle in Bi with
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the smallest price and x¯i is the population of buyers of this type who purchased some bundle,
then λi(x¯i) = p¯i.
Pricing Solutions, Social Welfare, and Revenue
We use (~p, ~x, ~y) to represent the outcome of the market mechanism. Here ~p is the vector of
prices, ~x denotes the allocation to the buyers with xi being the total amount of good purchased
by buyers of type i, and finally yt is the total amount of good t ∈ T sold to the buyers. We now
define the two main metrics that form the crux of this paper.
Definition The social welfare of a solution (~p, ~x, ~y) is defined to be the total utility of all the
buyers and the seller and therefore, is equal to the utility of the buyers minus the production
cost incurred by the seller, i.e.,
SW (~p, ~x, ~y) =
∑
i∈B
∫ xi
x=0
λi(x)dx−
∑
t∈T
Ct(yt).
Notice that the social welfare is independent of the prices, and depends only on (~x, ~y).
Definition The (seller’s) profit at the solution (~p, ~x, ~y) is the total income due to each good in
the market minus the total production cost incurred, i.e.,
pi(~p, ~x, ~y) =
∑
t∈T
[ptyt − Ct(yt)].
One of the main goals of this paper is to obtain a lower bound on the social welfare of
the profit maximizing solution. We will use ( ~popt, ~xopt, ~yopt) to denote the maximum profit
solution, and (~p∗, ~x∗, ~y∗) to denote the solution maximizing welfare. Sometimes we will also use
SW ∗ = SW (~p∗, ~x∗, ~y∗) and piopt = pi( ~popt, ~xopt, ~yopt). Thus the quantity we are interested in is
SW ( ~p∗, ~x∗, ~y∗)
SW ( ~popt, ~xopt, ~yopt)
.
We remark that the maximum social welfare solution should ideally be represented as ( ~x∗, ~y∗).
However, due to the following simple claim (inspired by a similar claim from [3]), we will define p∗t
as below, and let (~p∗, ~x∗, ~y∗) denote this specific welfare-maximizing solution. More importantly,
as we show in the Appendix, such a welfare maximizing solution can be computed efficiently via
a simple convex program.
Claim 2.1. There exists a welfare-maximizing solution (~p∗, ~x∗, ~y∗) where for every good t ∈ T ,
p∗t = ct(y∗t ). (Here ct is the derivative of Ct.)
Structure of the Demand and Cost Functions
In this work, we are interested in studying markets with many, many buyers and therefore, cor-
respondingly we take both the inverse demand and production cost functions to be continuously
differentiable. In addition, we also make the standard assumption that the utility function ui(x)
is concave for all i ∈ B and therefore its derivative λi(x) is non-increasing with x. Finally,
we consider production cost functions that are doubly convex i.e, both Ct and its derivative
ct(x) =
d
dxCt(x) are convex and non-decreasing for all t ∈ T and further, Ct(0) = ct(0) = 0. A
number of well studied cost functions fall within our framework [7].
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As mentioned previously, it is often natural to assume that the inverse demand distributions
for different buyer types have the same support [λmin, λmax]. In fact, all of our results hold
under the more general uniform peak assumption, which will be assumed for the rest of this
work.
Definition (Uniform Peak Assumption) For every i ∈ B, λi(0) = λmax.
α-SR inverse demand (Definition 1.1) Recently, α-strong regularity has gained some popular-
ity [15,16,24] as an elegant characterization of the class of regular functions, which encompasses
most well-studied demand distributions including polynomial (λ(x) = 1− x2; α = 0), exponen-
tial (λ(x) = e−x; α = 0), power law (λ(x) = 1√
x
; α = 12), and the equal-revenue distribution
(λ(x) = 1x ; α = 1). For such functions, one can interpret α as a measure of the convexity of
the function as larger values as α imply greater convexity or alternatively as a bound on the
volatility of the inverse demand λi(x) as every α-SR demand function satisfies
d
dx
(
λ(x)
|λ′(x)|
)
≤ α.
As expected, the equal-revenue distribution (α = 1) leads to the worst-case bounds for all of our
results: in fact even in single good, single buyer type markets, the revenue-optimal solution for
α = 1 only extracts a negligible fraction of the optimum social welfare. However, what is sur-
prising (as evidenced by Figure 1(a)) is that we obtain reasonably good performance guarantees
even when α is larger than 12 . Note that even α-SR functions with very small α include a very
large class of interesting demand functions (see above), including any log-concave function.
3 Warm-up: Profit and Welfare for Unit-Demand Markets
As a first step towards stating our general results in Section 5, we consider the important special
case of unit-demand markets, perhaps the most popular class of valuations in the algorithmic
pricing literature [9,12,21]. Recall that unit-demand valuations are a simple sub-class of multi-
minded functions, wherein for each buyer (type) i ∈ B, the bundles desired by i are singleton
sets. Therefore, we will overload notation, and when talking about unit-demand buyers say that
Bi ⊆ B is the set of items acceptable by all of the buyers of type i. Our main result in this
section is a simple pricing rule that achieves a (Θ( 11−α),
2−α
1−α)-bicriteria approximation algorithm
for revenue and welfare respectively when the buyers have α-SR inverse demand functions. While
we present a generalized version of this theorem in Section 5, the simple techniques from this
section do not really extend to multi-minded case. In fact, we require several new gadgets and
a more sophisticated pricing mechanism to achieve the generalization.
That said, our reasons for dedicating an entire section to unit-demand buyers is two-fold: (i)
the algorithm presented in this section is extremely simple and the constant factors hidden by
the asymptotic bound are smaller, and (ii) the unit-demand case provides a platform for us to
build intuition and more importantly, discuss the various implications of our results including
the profit-welfare trade-off and the ability to derive welfare bounds for the profit-maximizing
solution. Before stating our main theorem, we give a simple example to highlight the poor
revenue guarantees obtained by the welfare maximizing prices even for single-good markets.
Example 3.1. Consider a single good market with a negligible production cost function, say
C(x) = x. Obviously, there is only one buyer type, and suppose that its inverse demand is
λ(x) = 1 − x (α-SR for α = 0). It is easy to observe that at the social wefare maximizing
solution, the good is priced at p∗ = , resulting in near-zero revenue. On the contrary, one can
price at popt = 12 to obtain a constant fraction of the optimum welfare as profit.
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Theorem 3.2. For any unit-demand instance where buyers have α-strongly regular inverse
demand functions, there is a poly-time (ζ, 2−α1−α)-bicriteria approximation algorithm for revenue
and social welfare respectively, where
ζ = 2(
1
1− α)
1
α +
α
1− α = Θ
(
1
1− α
)
.
The exact guarantees for profit and welfare are illustrated in Figure 1(a).
(Algorithm) The bicriteria approximation factor is achieved by the following simple pricing
mechanism
• Compute the max-welfare solution (~p∗, ~x∗, ~y∗).
• For every good t, set its price p˜t = max (p∗t , λmax(1− α)
1
α ).
Proof Sketch: We prove this theorem in the Appendix, but here we give some intuition for
why this produces a good approximation to both profit and welfare. Let p˜ = λmax(1−α) 1α . We
begin by analyzing these types of thresholded pricing schemes, in which the price is simply the
maximum of the optimum price p∗t and a constant. In Lemma 3.3, we show that such solutions
have nice structure; essentially we can think of buyers who purchase goods priced at p˜ and those
who purchase goods priced at p∗t as separate systems.
Lemma 3.3. Suppose that ((p˜)t∈T , (x˜)i∈B, (y˜)t∈T ) is a pricing solution resulting from a thresh-
olded pricing vector. Then,
1. The market can be clustered into two mutually disjoint sets of buyers and goods (BH , TH)
and (BL, TL) so that the buyers in each cluster only purchase the goods in the same cluster
and (a) for (i, t) ∈ (BH , TH), p˜t = p∗t , x˜i = x∗i , and y˜t = y∗t ; (b) for (i, t) ∈ (BL, TL),
p˜t ≥ p∗t , x˜i ≤ x∗i , and ct(y˜t) ≤ ct(y∗t ).
2. ~˜y is a welfare-maximizing allocation vector with respect to the demand vector ~˜x.
We then prove that due to our choice of p˜ the following two bounds hold:
SW (~˜p, ~˜x, ~˜y) ≤ (2( 1
1− α)
1
α − 1)pi(~˜p, ~˜x, ~˜y),
and
SW (~p∗, ~x∗, ~y∗)− SW (~˜p, ~˜x, ~˜y) ≤ 1
1− αpi(
~˜p, ~˜x, ~˜y).
Once we show those lower bounds on the profit of our pricing scheme, we apply the following
simple claim to finish the proof of the theorem. While the difficult parts of our argument lie
in proving the above bounds, we state the claim here since, despite its technical simplicity, we
believe that this claim and our general approach may find application in other settings.
Claim 3.4. Suppose that for some solution s we have that SW (s) ≤ c1pi(s), and SW ∗−SW (s) ≤
c2pi(s). Then, s is a (c1 + c2, c2 + 1)-bicriteria approximation to (profit,welfare); moreover
SW ∗ ≤ (c1 + c2)pi(s). 
Henceforth, we will unambiguously use ζ to denote the exact approximation factor appearing
in the statement of the above theorem. Interestingly, in the proof of Theorem 3.2, the revenue
guarantee of ζ is shown with respect to the optimum social welfare, which in turn has important
consequences for other profit-maximizing solutions (see Section 4). For now, we just state this
revenue guarantee formally.
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Corollary 3.5. The profit obtained by the pricing mechanism in Theorem 3.2 is always within
a factor ζ of the optimum social welfare.
3.0.1 Profit-Welfare Trade-offs
We further exploit the close ties between revenue and social welfare, and present a revenue-
welfare trade-off that improves upon the bicriteria bound in Theorem 3.2 by showing that at
least one of revenue or welfare is better than the factor guaranteed by the theorem. The bounds
in Theorem 3.2 are actually somewhat misleading as they represent the worst-case bound for
each objective, which is derived independently from the other objective by simply bounding
the worst-case revenue (or welfare) over all instances. However, the worst-case performance for
revenue (ζ) and the worst-case performance for social welfare (2−α1−α) need not and as we show, do
not occur for the same instance. As a matter of fact, for a given instance, if the actual welfare
obtained is close to the guarantee provided in Theorem 3.2, the large gap between welfare and
revenue as in Figure 1(a) completely vanishes and the approximation factors coincide.
We first state the main structural claim that enables this trade-off.
Claim 3.6. Suppose that a pricing algorithm Alg satisfies SW (Alg) ≤ c1pi(Alg), SW ∗ −
SW (Alg) ≤ c2pi(Alg). Then for every instance there exists some 1 ≤ c ≤ c2 + 1 such that
Alg is a bicriteria approximation (min(cc1,
cc2
c−1), c) for revenue and welfare respectively.
Unfortunately, the designer has no control over the factor c as its exact value depends on
the particular instance. Applying this claim to Theorem 3.2 yields the following corollary.
Corollary 3.7. For every given instance, there exists a constant 1 ≤ c ≤ 2−α1−α so that the
solution returned by the prices of Theorem 3.2 has a social welfare that is within a factor c of
the optimum welfare and such that
piopt ≤ SW ∗ ≤ min( c
c− 1 .
1
1− α, ζ)pi(Alg).
For example, for MHR demand functions the statement of Theorem 3.2 makes it seem that
this pricing scheme may return a solution which is a 2e-approximation for revenue and a 2-
approximation for welfare. Corollary 3.7 points out that the actual results are far better. As
Figure 1(b) illustrates for MHR demand, tradeoffs between revenue and welfare actually guar-
antee that when revenue is far from optimum, welfare is very high, and vice versa.
4 Consequences for Solutions with High Revenue
In Sections 3 and 5, we give efficient pricing mechanisms which simultaneously achieve good
approximations for both revenue and welfare. Consider, however, a seller whose main priority
is to simply maximize profits. This seller may choose to use a different pricing mechanism with
better revenue guarantees than the ones offered in this paper. For example, the seller may choose
prices which are guaranteed to come closer to achieving optimum revenue (these are efficiently
computable for unit-demand settings [3, 22] under certain additional assumptions), or even use
a large amount of resources to solve the intractable problem of actually computing prices popt
which yield the highest possible revenue. One of the main messages of our paper is as follows:
No matter what pricing mechanism the seller uses to optimize revenue, they can instead use
a pricing mechanism which guarantees at least 1/ζ fraction of the optimum welfare, without
sacrificing any revenue.
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In this section, we use a simple albeit highly general framework to derive results of this
form. Although this framework is defined in terms of our model, it is actually general and
applies across a wide variety of markets.
Recall that SW ∗ denotes the optimum social welfare and piopt denotes the maximum achiev-
able profit. Given a pricing algorithm Alg, we will refer to the social welfare of the solution
returned by Alg using SW (Alg), and its profit by pi(Alg). Consider an arbitrary profit maxi-
mization algorithm Alg that achieves a good approximation with respect to piopt. How do we go
about characterizing the social welfare at these solutions? The following theorem uses an exist-
ing profit-maximization algorithm whose guarantees hold with respect to the optimum welfare
as a black-box to bound the welfare due to Alg.
Theorem 4.1. Consider a benchmark profit maximization algorithm Algb whose profit pi(Algb)
is always within a c factor of SW ∗ for some c ≥ 1. Consider any other pricing algorithm Alg
for the same class of valuations that obtains at least as much profit as guaranteed by Algb on
all instances. Then the social welfare obtained by Alg is at least a factor 1c times that of the
optimum welfare.
The proof simply follows from the fact that SW (Alg) ≥ pi(Alg) ≥ pi(Algb) ≥ SW ∗c .
Implications for Unit-Demand Markets
We now apply the framework provided by Theorem 4.1 for unit-demand using our result from
Theorem 3.2 as a black-box.
Claim 4.2. Let Alg be any algorithm for unit-demand markets that obtains at least as much
profit as guaranteed by the algorithm of Theorem 3.2 on all instances. Then the social welfare
obtained by Alg is at least a factor 1ζ times that of the optimum welfare.
Thus, consider the case when a seller is using any arbitrary pricing mechanism Alg, with
the main goal being to maximize profit. By simply computing the revenue given by our pric-
ing schemes from Section 3, and then choosing the one which guarantees better revenue (i.e.,
choosing between Alg and our pricing scheme), we form a new pricing algorithm which does
not sacrifice any revenue compared to Alg, and due to the above theorem, is also guaranteed to
have good social welfare. Moreover, for sellers who are able to compute the prices which result
in absolute maximum revenue, the following is a trivial consequence of the above theorem:
Corollary 4.3. The ratio of the optimum social welfare SW ∗ to the social welfare at the maxi-
mum profit solution SW ( ~popt, ~xopt, ~yopt) is at most ζ = Θ
(
1
1−α
)
.
For example, for MHR demand functions (α = 0), this implies that even for sellers who
only care about profits, there is essentially no excuse not to also guarantee at least 1/2e of the
optimum social welfare. Thus, for the settings we consider, one can strive for truly high revenue,
without sacrificing much in welfare.
5 Multi-Minded Buyers
We now move on to our most general case with multi-minded buyers, wherein every buyer wishes
to purchase one bundle from a desired set (of bundles). We use `max to denote the cardinality of
the maximum sized bundle desired by any buyer type, and `min for the minimum sized bundle.
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The main result in this section is a bicriteria approximation algorithm that extends our results
for the unit-demand case. Our algorithm still achieves a Θ( 11−α)-approximation to the optimum
welfare; as for profit, we obtain a Θ( 11−α) bound further discounted by a log(∆) factor, where
∆ = `
max
`min
.
Moreover, as in the previous section, our profit bound is obtained in terms of the optimum
social welfare, which allows the consequences mentioned in Section 4 as well as an analog of
Corollary 3.7 to hold showing that the true lower bounds are better than the theorem states.
Theorem 5.1. For any given instance with multi-minded buyers, there exists a poly-time(
Θ( log(∆)1−α ),Θ(
1
1−α)
)
-bicriteria approximation algorithm for profit and welfare respectively.
Proof Sketch: The proof for the general case with multi-minded buyers is quite involved (see
Appendix B), so here we provide a high level overview of the various ingredients that combine
to form the proof.
Step 1: Benchmark Solution. The first step involves defining a benchmark solution (~xb, ~yb) whose
social welfare, as in the unit-demand case, is at most a 2−α1−α factor away from SW
∗. Specifically,
define p˜ = λmax(1− α) 1α . Now, the benchmark demand vector ~xb is defined as follows: for each
buyer i, xbi = min{x∗i , λ−1(p˜)}. The allocation vector ~yb is simply a scaled-down version of the
optimum allocation vector, i.e., suppose that x∗i (S) is amount of bundle S consumed by buyer
type i in (~p∗, ~x∗, ~y∗). Then, the amount of bundle S consumed by i in the benchmark solution
xbi(S) :=
xbi
x∗i
x∗i (S). This consumption pattern gives rise to the allocation vector
~yb on the goods.
Let SW b denote the social welfare of this benchmark solution.
In the unit-demand case, we were able to identify a suitable price vector to actually implement
this benchmark solution and extract a good fraction of its welfare as revenue. However, this
is no longer be possible for the general case, as an analogous pricing solution would involve
personalized payments for each buyer and thus may not be realizable using simple item pricing.
For convenience, we define pib =
∑
i∈B λi(x
b
i)x
b
i −C(~yb) to be the profit due to the personalized
payments. Observe that if we allow for discriminatory prices, then the revenue maximization
becomes almost trivial.
Despite its lack of implementability, the benchmark solution’s appeal is due to the fact that
both SW b and pib approximate SW ∗ up to a Θ( 11−α) factor, which we can be shown using similar
arguments as in the unit-demand case. This is still a non-trivial claim; even with personalized
payments, it is not clear if we can ever approximate the optimum social welfare via profit.
Now that we have a benchmark solution which achieves good welfare and revenue, but is not
implementable using item pricing, our goal in this proof becomes to compute item prices which
approximate this benchmark solution in both revenue and welfare.
Step 2: Augmented Walrasian Equilibrium. Our goal will be to use (~xb, ~yb) as a guide to
design a sequence of (item) pricing solutions that together behave like the benchmark solution,
and return the ‘best approximation’ among these solutions. Towards this end, we introduce
the notion of an Augmented Walrasian Equilibrium with dummy price pd, which is a social
welfare maximizing solution for an augmented problem, consisting of the original instance plus
|T | dummy buyers having constant valuation pd, one for each good t ∈ T . Our notion of an
augmented Walrasian equilibrium can be viewed an extension of the Walrasian Equilibrium with
reserve prices concept introduced in [21] to settings where buyers purchase bundles of arbitrary
sizes. Unlike the unit-demand case where there is a linear relationship between the reserve price
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and the revenue, bounding the profit in equilibrium solutions (once dummy buyers are removed)
with multi-minded buyers and production costs require a careful characterization of the various
goods. Specifically, there are really two types of goods in such solutions: ones that are saturated,
i.e., pt = ct(yt), and ones which are artificially limited by the dummy price p
d, so pt = p
d.
Step 3: Starting dummy price. The plan is to form a sequence of solutions resulting from
Augmented Walrasian Equilibria with dummy prices, but what dummy price should we start
with? Here we prove the following crucial claim. The main argument which makes this claim
work is the ability to charge any deviation from the benchmark solution to the saturated goods
in the current pricing solution, which are guaranteed to provide good welfare.
Claim 5.2. Suppose that (~p, ~x, ~y) denotes a pricing solution for the original instance obtained
via an augmented Walrasian equilibrium with dummy price p˜2`max . Then,
SW ∗ − SW (~p, ~x, ~y) ≤
(
5 +
6
1− α
)
[pi(~p, ~x, ~y) + pi(~p∗, ~x∗, ~y∗)].
Step 4: Sequence of Solutions. Previously, we identified a suitable dummy price and proved
that the solution obtained via the augmented equilibrium at this dummy price (to some extent)
captures most of the welfare of the benchmark solution. What about the profit of this solution?
When all of the bundles desired by buyers are of equal cardinality, one can immediately show
that the solution’s profit also mimics that of the personalized payment scheme in the benchmark
solution, pib. When there is large disparity in the bundle sizes, however, the dummy price may
result in buyers gravitating towards the smaller sized bundles. How do we fix this?
We next consider augmented Walrasian equilibria at dummy prices that are scaled versions
of the original dummy price p˜2`max , and once again, charge the lost welfare (due to a buyer facing
high prices compared to her personalized payment in the benchmark solution) special class of
saturated goods, which always yield high revenue. The profit due to the saturated goods is
no larger than the social welfare of the solution, and thus, in either event, the social welfare
cannot be small. More formally, we define a series of pricing solutions (~p(j), ~x(j), ~y(j)) for j = 1
to j = δ = dlog(∆)e + 1 to be the pricing solution for the original instance obtained via the
augmented Walrasian equilibrium at dummy price 2j p˜2`max . Let us also define SW (j) and pi(j)
to be the social welfare and profit of the respective pricing solutions. Then, we have that:
Claim 5.3. For every j ∈ [0, δ], SW (j)− SW (j + 1) ≤ 3pi(j) + 3pi(j + 1).
Since we can bound the difference in welfare via profit, we can sequentially build solutions
with good social welfare until we either reach a solution with good profit or j = 1 + δ is reached,
and we have no more solutions to construct. Now combining the above claims along with an
upper bound on SW (δ+ 1) in terms of pi(δ+ 1) (which we prove in the Appendix), we obtain a
bound on SW ∗ in terms of the profits of various solutions, which would imply that the max-profit
solution approximates the optimum welfare up to the desired bound.
Claim 5.4.
SW ∗ ≤
(
8 + 2(
1
1− α)
1
α + 4
1
1− α
)
[
1+δ∑
j=0
pi(j) + pi(~p∗, ~x∗, ~y∗)].
Step 5: Final Pricing Algorithm. Unfortunately, the above argument is still not strong enough to
give us a bicriteria bound where the welfare is independent of ∆. In the statement of Claim 5.4,
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there are 2 + log(∆) profit terms on the right hand side; therefore, the solution giving maxi-
mum profit among pi(0), pi(1), . . . , pi(δ + 1) and pi(~p∗, ~x∗, ~y∗) must yield a (2 + log(∆))Θ( 11−α)
approximation to both profit and welfare.
In our final step of the proof, we take this proof further and show that if the max-profit
solution from the above claim does not result in a good welfare, then one can in fact identify
another such solution with similar profit guarantees but much better welfare. Specifially, we show
that by using some careful analysis, one can instead compute a solution whose approximation
for social welfare is simply Θ( 11−α) and thus, is independent of ∆. We now define our main
algorithm: for the purpose of continuity, let pi(−1) represent pi(~p∗, ~x∗, ~y∗).
1. Let k be the smallest index in the range [−1, 1 + δ] such that SW ∗pi(k) is no larger than
2(log(∆) + 2){
(
8 + 2( 11−α)
1
α + 4 11−α
)
}.
2. Return the solution (~p(k), ~x(k), ~y(k)).
From Claim 5.4, it is clear that there exists at least one index k providing the desired
guarantee. In fact, if k = −1, then we are done because the solution returned is the one
maximizing social welfare. In our final claim (see Appendix), we show that for k defined as
above, we have that SW ∗ is within a factor of 12(2−α1−α) of SW (k). -
Applying structural Claim 3.6 to the above proof, we get profit-welfare trade-offs analogous
to Corollary 3.7, namely that for every given instance, there exists a constant 1 ≤ c ≤ 12(2−α1−α),
so that if SW ∗ = cSW (Alg), then SW ∗ ≤ 2cc−2(5 + 61−α)pi(Alg), when c ≥ 2. For instance,
this implies that either SW (Alg) ≥ SW ∗3 or that pi(Alg) is actually a Θ( 11−α)-approximation to
OPT. Here Alg refers to our bicriteria algorithm from Theorem 5.1.
Consequences for other high-revenue solutions.
A direct application of Theorem 4.1 using our newly obtained bounds on multi-minded buyers
as an intermediate yields the following claim.
Claim 5.5. Let Alg be any algorithm that obtains at least as much profit as guaranteed by the
algorithm of Theorem 5.1 on all instances. Then the social welfare obtained by Alg is at most a
factor Θ( log(∆)1−α ) away from the optimum welfare.
6 Conclusion and Future Directions
In this work, we were able to provide envy-free posted pricing algorithms that simultaneously
approximate both profit and social welfare for markets with quite general buyer valuations and
production costs. Such multi-objective algorithms are extremely well-motivated in a variety of
realistic settings, where revenue and welfare are closely interconnected. We used our profit-
maximization guarantees as a black-box and showed that any solution with reasonable profit
guarantees (including the maximum profit solution) generates good welfare. In the process, we
provide a partial characterization of the exact friction between these two objectives.
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A Appendix: Proof of Theorem 3.2 for Unit-Demand Buyers
We begin by defining some notation pertinent to the proof. Given a price vector ~p, we will
use qi(~p) to denote the price of the minimally priced good desired by buyer type i, i.e., qi(~p) =
mint∈Bi pt. For the rest of the proof, we will use the terms buyer and buyer type interchangeably.
Recall that under any solution (~p, ~x, ~y), if buyer i purchases non-zero amount of good t ∈ Bi,
then pt = qi(~p) = λi(xi). More specifically, we will only consider solutions that minimize the
overall cost subject to the constraint that each buyer i only purchases from the minimally priced
goods in Si. That is, given ~p, ~x, there are several candidate allocation vectors ~y that correspond
to valid distributions of the demand vector ~x on the goods. Unless mentioned otherwise, all of
our solutions will consider allocation vectors that minimize the total cost C(~y) =
∑
t∈T Ct(yt)
among the set of valid allocation vectors. Observe that in such a solution, if buyer i purchases
two different goods t, t′, then it has to be the case that the marginal cost of the two goods are
equal, i.e., ct(yt) = ct′(yt′). Therefore, without loss of generality, we can use ri(~y) to denote
the marginal cost of any of the goods being used by buyer i under the given allocation. We
will also use C(~y) as a shortcut for the total cost incurred under a given allocation ~y, i.e.,
C(~y) =
∑
t∈T Ct(yt).
The Social Welfare Maximizing Solution
The optimum welfare solution OPTW := (~p∗, ~x∗, ~y∗) is the pricing solution that maximizes
the total social welfare of the system. The following simple claim (inspired by a similar claim
from [3]) provides a useful characterization of the optimum solution.
Claim A.1. There exists an optimum solution (~p∗, ~x∗, ~y∗) where for every good t ∈ T , p∗t =
ct(y
∗
t ).
We also define the notion of a welfare-maximizing solution constrained by demand. Specifi-
cally, an allocation vector ~y is said to be a welfare-maximizer with respect to given demand ~x,
if ~y is the minimum cost allocation consistent with the demand vector ~x.
Computing the Welfare Maximizing Solution
The algorithm described in Section 3 explicitly uses the prices in the social welfare maximizing
solution OPTW . In order to compute the prices efficiently, we use the following convex pro-
gram to compute the welfare maximizing demand and allocation vector ( ~x∗, ~y∗) and then apply
Claim A.1 to obtain the corresponding price vector.
max
∑
i∈B
∫ xi
x=0
λi(x)dx−
∑
t∈T
Ct(yt)
s.t.
∑
t:t∈Bi
xit = xi ∀i ∈ B∑
i:t∈Bi
xit = yt ∀t ∈ T
xit, xi, yt ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ B, t ∈ T
(1)
We now proceed with the proof of the theorem. The proof conforms to the following structure:
first, we define a special pricing strategy known as a thresholded pricing vector and prove
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that such a strategy satisfies some desirable properties. After this, we impose some sufficient
conditions on such a pricing vector that allow us to prove bicriteria approximation bounds on
the revenue and welfare. Finally, we prove that the thresholded pricing strategy presented in
Section 3 does indeed satisfy these sufficient conditions.
Proof. The main instrument that allows us to design a simple but efficient pricing strategy is the
notion of a thresholded pricing vector. Such a pricing vector extends uniform pricing strategies
(all goods have the same price), which have been successfully applied to design solutions with
good revenue [5] towards settings with production costs. We will show that thresholded pricing
vectors enjoy many desirable properties and are convenient to analyze as opposed to the revenue
maximizing solution, which is hard to get a grip on.
Definition (Thresholded Pricing Vector) A pricing vector ~p is said to be a thresholded pricing
vector if ∃ a primary price p˜ such that for every good t, pt = max(p˜, p∗t ).
We begin with a useful lemma that allows us to characterize the allocation resulting from a
thresholded pricing vector.
Lemma A.2 (Lemma 3.3 from Section 3). Suppose that ((p˜)t∈T , (x˜)i∈B, (y˜)t∈T ) is a pricing
solution resulting from a thresholded pricing vector. Then,
1. The market can be clustered into two mutually disjoint sets of buyers and goods (BH , TH)
and (BL, TL) so that the buyers in each cluster only purchase the goods in the same cluster
and (a) for (i, t) ∈ (BH , TH), p˜t = p∗t , x˜i = x∗i , and y˜t = y∗t ; (b) for (i, t) ∈ (BL, TL),
p˜t ≥ p∗t , x˜i ≤ x∗i , and ct(y˜t) ≤ ct(y∗t ).
2. ~˜y is a welfare-maximizing allocation vector with respect to the demand vector ~˜x.
Proof. Divide the buyers and goods as follows: let TH be the set of goods with price (strictly)
higher than p˜ and let BH be the buyers using these goods. Define TL as the goods with price
p˜ and BL as the corresponding buyers. Since each buyer only purchases from the min-priced
goods available to her, buyers in BL will only purchase (some of) the goods in TL, and the same
is true for those in BH .
We begin by characterizing the solution corresponding to (BH , TH): for all t ∈ TH , p˜t = p∗t
as per the definition of ~˜p. Consider any buyer i ∈ BH ; clearly no good in TL can belong to
this buyer’s desired set Bi since she is using the minimally priced good(s) available to her. This
price must be exactly qi(~p∗) and thus her demand must also be x˜i = x∗i . Next, for every good
t′ ∈ TL and t ∈ TH , p∗t′ ≤ p˜ < p∗t . Therefore, every buyer who is using a good in TH in optimum
welfare solution will still be using that good in our proxy solution. We can, therefore conclude
that for all t ∈ TH , y˜t = y∗t .
Finally, look at any good t ∈ TL, which is priced at exactly p˜. By definition, p˜ ≥ p∗t . There-
fore, for every buyer i ∈ TL, qi(~p∗) ≤ p˜ = qi(~˜p). And so, x˜i ≤ x∗i . Since every buyer’s demand
is smaller in our solution w.r.t the max-welfare solution, we can use Lemma C.1 just for the
buyers and goods in (BL, TL). We get that for every t ∈ TL, ct(y˜t) ≤ ct(y∗t ).
(Part 2): In order to show that ~˜y has the smallest cost among all feasible allocations satisfying
demand vector ~˜x, it is sufficient (and necessary) to prove that for every buyer i, and every good
t such that t ∈ Bi, ri(~˜y) ≤ ct(y˜t). Recall that every good t is priced at either p∗t or at p˜ if p˜ > p∗t .
By definition, we have two min-cost sub-allocations: 1) buyers in BL are using the cheapest
possible allocation using only the items in TL because all goods in TL have the same price
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and we consider only cost minimizing allocations for the given pricing solution; 2) the same
is true for BH and TH , this is because for these entities, the allocation is the same as in the
max-welfare solution, which must definitely minimize cost for any given subset of the actual
buyers and goods. So, in order to prove that this is a min-cost flow, we only need to consider
the cross-edges, i.e., buyers belonging to BL and goods desired by these buyers belonging to
TH . We already know that for any given buyer in BH and good t ∈ TL, t /∈ Bi. So we can
conveniently ignore this case. What about the reverse case, can there be a buyer i in BL and
an item t in TH such that ct(y˜t) = ct(y
∗
t ) < ri(~˜y)?
We know that for every t′ ∈ TL, ct′(y˜t′) ≤ ct′(y∗t′). Since all buyers in BL are using these
goods in both the current solution and in (~p∗, ~x∗, ~y∗), it must be that for every such buyer
i ∈ BL, ri(~˜y) ≤ ri( ~y∗). But since i does not use any good t ∈ TH even in the optimum solution,
we get that ri( ~y∗) ≤ ct(y∗t ) = ct(y˜t). This completes the proof.
Now that we have a better understanding of thresholded pricing solutions, i.e., solutions re-
sulting from thresholded pricing vectors, we are ready to prove our main theorem ala Lemma 3.4
by constructing a suitable threshold vector and establishing upper bounds on SW (Alg) and
SW ∗ − SW (Alg). We divide the proof into three major claims: in the first two claims, we
consider a general thresholded pricing solution and establish sufficient conditions that allow us
to derive useful upper bounds on pi(Alg) as a function of the primary price p˜. Following this,
we construct an actual thresholded pricing vector that satisfies the required sufficient conditions
and complete the proof.
Claim A.3. Suppose that (~˜p, ~˜x, ~˜y) is a thresholded pricing solution with primary price p˜. Then,
the total social welfare of this solution SW (~˜p, ~˜x, ~˜y) is at most a factor 2λ
max
p˜ − 1 times the profit
due to this solution pi(~˜p, ~˜x, ~˜y).
Proof. The social welfare of the current solution is
∑
i∈B ui(x˜i) − C(~˜y). The function ui is
concave for every i ∈ B, and therefore ui(x˜i) ≤ u′i(0) · x˜i = λmax · x˜i. So, our first inequality is
the following,
∑
i∈B
ui(x˜i)− C(~˜y) ≤
∑
i∈B
λmaxx˜i − C(~˜y) = λ
max
p˜
∑
i∈B
p˜x˜i − C(~˜y) ≤ λ
max
p˜
∑
t∈T
p˜ty˜t − C(~˜y).
The final inequality comes from the fact that p˜ ≤ p˜t for all t ∈ T and from rearranging the
allocation from the buyers to the goods. Now, the total profit that the seller makes at the given
strategy pi(~˜p, ~˜x, ~˜y) equals
∑
t∈T p˜ty˜t − C(~y). Using this, we get the following upper bound for
the ratio of the welfare to profit∑
i∈B ui(x˜i)− C(~˜y)
pi(~˜p, ~˜x, ~˜y)
≤
λmax
p˜
∑
t∈T p˜ty˜t − C(~˜y)∑
t∈T p˜ty˜t − C(~y)
≤
λmax
p˜
∑
t∈T p˜ty˜t −
∑
t∈T
1
2ct(y˜t)y˜t∑
t∈T [p˜t − 12ct(y˜t)]y˜t
≤
∑
t∈T
λmax
p˜ p˜ty˜t − 12 p˜ty˜t∑
t∈T [p˜ty˜t − 12 p˜ty˜t]
= 2
λmax
p˜
− 1.
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The second inequality above comes from the definition of doubly convex cost functions
according to which Ct(y˜t) ≤ 12ct(y˜t). The third inequality comes from the fact that for ev-
ery t, ct(y˜t) ≤ p˜t. To see why this is true, observe from Lemma 3.3 that for every t ∈ T ,
ct(y˜t) ≤ ct(y∗t ) = p∗t ≤ p˜t. This completes the proof of the first of our three claims.
Claim A.4. Suppose that (~˜p, ~˜x, ~˜y) is a thresholded pricing solution with primary price p˜ satis-
fying the following condition,
• For every i ∈ B, either λi(x˜i)−ri(~˜y)|λ′i(x˜i)| ≤ x˜i or λi(x
∗
i ) ≥ p˜.
Then, the difference in social welfare with respect to OPTW ,i.e., SW2 := SW
∗−SW (~˜p, ~˜x, ~˜y) is
at most a factor 11−α times the profit due to this solution pi(~˜p, ~˜x, ~˜y).
Proof. We need to prove an upper bound on SW ∗ − SW (~˜p, ~˜x, ~˜y) = ∑i∈B(ui(x∗i ) − ui(x˜i)) −
(C( ~y∗) − C(~˜y)). Applying Lemma C.2, we get that (C( ~y∗) − C(~˜y)) ≥ ∑i∈B ri(~˜y)(x∗i − x˜i).
Writing the utility as an integral, the required welfare can be simplified as
SW2 ≤
∑
i∈B
[
∫ x∗i
x˜i
λi(x)dx− ri(~˜y)(x∗i − x˜i)] =
∑
i∈B
∫ x∗i
x˜i
(λi(x)− ri(~˜y))dx.
Now, consider the function fi(x) = λi(x) − ri(~˜y). The second term is constant w.r.t x
and λi is α-SR and so from Lemma D.1, fi is also α-SR for all i ∈ B. Next, we can use our
crucial Lemma D.2 to bound the integral as follows
∫ x∗i
x˜i
fi(x)dx ≤ 11−α( fi(x˜i)|f ′i(x˜i)|)(fi(x˜i)− f(x
∗
i )).
Summing this up, one obtains,
SW2 ≤ 1
1− α
∑
i∈B
λi(x˜i)− ri(~˜y)
|λ′i(x˜i)|
(λi(x˜i)− λi(x∗i )).
Let BL and BH be as in Lemma 3.3. For i ∈ BH , we know that λi(x˜i) = p˜i = p∗i = λi(x∗i ),
so the above expression equals 0. From the claim statement, we know that for i ∈ BL, the
quantity λi(x˜i)−ri(
~˜y)
|λ′i(x˜i)| must be bounded from above by x˜i. Thus, we have that,
SW2 ≤ 1
1− α
∑
i∈BL
x˜i(λi(x˜i)− ri( ~y∗)).
Now, we can complete the proof using the fact that for all i, λi(x˜i)x˜i is the total profit due
to that buyer.
SW2 ≤ 1
1− α
∑
t∈T
[y˜tp˜t − ct(y˜t)y˜t] ≤ 1
1− α [
∑
t∈T
y˜tp˜t − C(~˜y)] = 1
1− αpi(
~˜p, ~˜x, ~˜y).
We have shown that if we can conjure up a nice thresholded price vector that satisfies
certain properties, we can bound the social welfare of the optimum solution in terms of the
profit obtained by the above solution. We now show that the price vector described in Section 3
satisfies all of our requirements.
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Claim A.5. We can compute in poly-time a solution ((p˜)t∈T , (x˜)i∈B, (y˜)t∈T ) satisfying the fol-
lowing two conditions,
1. ∃ a price p˜ such that for every t ∈ T , p˜t = max(p∗t , p˜).
2. For every i ∈ B, either λi(x˜i)−ri(~˜y)|λ′i(x˜i)| ≤ xi or λi(x
∗
i ) ≥ p˜.
Proof. Suppose that all the users have α-strongly regular utilities. Then, set p˜ = (1−α) 1αλmax.
Construct the price vector ~˜p as described above. Moreover, let ~˜x and ~˜y be the corresponding
buyer demand vector and (feasible) allocation vector at this price. All that is remaining is to
prove that this solution satisfies the second condition mentioned in the claim.
Consider any i ∈ B: the min-priced good available to this buyer is priced at either p˜ or
qi(~p∗). In the p˜ case, we know that the user has a demand of x˜i units satisfying λi(x˜i) = p˜ =
λmax(1− α) 1α . By definition λmax = λi(0) for all i. Therefore, for every user facing a price of p˜
we have that
λi(0) = (
1
1− α)
1/αλi(x˜i).
We can loosen the above inequality as follows: λi(0)− ri(~˜y) ≥ ( 11−α)1/α(λi(x˜i)− ri(~˜y)). Now
take fi(x) = λi(x)− ri(~˜y) and apply corollary D.5 with respect to x˜i. We get that fi(x˜i)|f ′i(x˜i)| ≤ x˜i,
which is the required criterion.
For the second case, the proof follows trivially because the min-priced good t available to
the user i has a price of p∗t > p˜. This is the same as the min-priced good available to this user
in the optimum solution and therefore λi(x˜i) = λi(x
∗
i ) = p
∗
t ≥ p˜.
Final Leg: Combining all of the Claims
The rest of the proof follows from a direct application of our structural lemmas. Primarily,
consider the pricing algorithm Alg, that chooses a pricing vector as defined in Claim A.5. Then,
from Claims A.3 and A.4, we get that SW (Alg) ≤
(
(2 11−α)
1
α − 1
)
pi(Alg) and SW ∗−SW (Alg) ≤
1
1−αpi(Alg). Applying Lemma 3.4 yields the required bicriteria result.
Finally, we claim that ζ = Θ( 11−α). To see why, consider the function
2( 1
1−α )
1
α
1
1−α
. Upon
differentiation, we infer that this function is non-increasing and its maximum value of 2e is
obtained as x→ 0.
B Appendix: Proof of Theorem 5.1 for Multi-Minded Buyers
Proof Sketch: The proof for the general case with multi-minded buyers is quite involved and
so we begin by providing a high level overview of the various ingredients that combine to form
the proof. The first step involves defining a benchmark solution (~xb, ~yb) whose social welfare, as
in the unit-demand case, is at most a 2−α1−α factor away from SW
∗. In the unit-demand case, we
were able to identify a suitable price vector to actually implement this benchmark solution and
extract a good fraction of its welfare as revenue. However, this may no longer be possible for the
general case as an analogous pricing solution would involve personalized payments for each buyer
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and thus may not be realizable using simple item pricing. In other words, the benchmark solution
is only realizable by charging different prices to different buyers for the same good, instead of
item pricing in which a good has a single price for all buyers. Charging such discriminatory
prices would change the problem completely and give the seller much more power (for example,
maximizing revenue becomes almost trivial, instead of NP-Complete). Our goal in this proof is
therefore to compute item prices which approximate this benchmark solution in both revenue
and welfare.
The rest of the proof does not really use the benchmark solution directly; instead our goal
will be to use (~xb, ~yb) as a guide to design a sequence of (item) pricing solutions that together
behave like the benchmark solution, and return the ‘best approximation’ among these solutions.
Towards this end, we introduce the notion of an Augmented Walrasian Equilibrium with dummy
price p, which is a social welfare maximizing solution for an augmented problem, consisting of
the original instance plus |T | dummy buyers having constant valuation p, one for each good
t ∈ T . One way to think about this is as a Walrasian equilibrium with a reserve price p for each
good, so that the prices are required to be above p. We show that these augmented equilibria
have several desirable properties once the dummy buyers are removed from the final solution.
The starting point for our algorithm is the identification of a carefully chosen dummy price
(see Claim 5.2) so that the ensuing augmented equilibrium (minus the dummy buyers) captures
the welfare of the benchmark solution to a large extent. Of course, the solution may not extract
the required profit, and to correct this (Claim 5.3), we show that simply scaling the dummy
price by a factor of two yields a solution whose welfare still approximates the original solution.
The repeated scaling gives us a sequence of log(∆) different pricing solutions. Finally, we show
that at least one solution in this sequence has profit and welfare which both approximate that
of the benchmark solution.
Both of the above claims make use of a charging argument that may be of independent
interest, wherein the lost welfare (due to a buyer facing high prices compared to her personalized
payment in the benchmark solution) is charged to a special class of goods, referred to as saturated
goods, which always yield high revenue.
Proof. Benchmark Solution
Recall that (~p∗, ~x∗, ~y∗) denotes the pricing solution achieving the optimum social welfare. Define
p˜ = λmax(1 − α) 1α . Now, the benchmark demand vector ~xb is defined as follows: for each
buyer i, xbi = min{x∗i , λ−1(p˜)}. The allocation vector ~yb is simply a scaled-down version of the
optimum allocation vector, i.e., suppose that x∗i (S) is amount of bundle S consumed by buyer
type i in (~p∗, ~x∗, ~y∗). Then, the amount of bundle S consumed by i in the benchmark solution
xbi(S) :=
xbi
x∗i
x∗i (S). This consumption pattern gives rise to the allocation vector
~yb on the goods.
Let SW b denote the social welfare of this benchmark solution.
Does there exist a pricing solution ~pb with a single price per good that implements the
above benchmark solution? Unfortunately, one can easily define instances where this is not
the case. That said, a trivial way to implement the benchmark solution is via a personalized
payment scheme, i.e., each buyer i is charged a price of λi(x
b
i) that is completely independent
of other buyers. For convenience, we define pib =
∑
i∈B λi(x
b
i)x
b
i − C(~yb) to be the profit due
to the personalized payments. We begin by highlighting an obvious property of the benchmark
solution that will come in handy later on.
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Proposition B.1. The benchmark solution vectors are dominated by the optimum solution
vectors, i.e., ~x∗ ≥ ~xb and ~y∗ ≥ ~yb. Therefore for every good t, ct(ybt ) ≤ ct(y∗t ).
Despite its lack of implementability, the benchmark solution’s appeal lies in the fact that
both SW b and pib approximate SW ∗ up to a Θ( 11−α) factor, which we formally state below.
Observe that this is still a non-trivial claim; even with personalized payments, it is not clear if
we can ever approximate the optimum social welfare via profit. For instance, for the max-welfare
solution ( ~x∗, ~y∗), a personalized charging scheme achieves the same profit as pi(~p∗, ~x∗, ~y∗), which
may be quite poor. Our goal however, will be to use (~xb, ~yb) as a guide to design a sequence of
(item) pricing solutions that together behave like the benchmark solution, and return the ‘best
approximation’ among these solutions.
Claim B.2. (1) SW b ≤
[
2( 11−α)
1
α − 1
]
pib (2) SW ∗ − SW b ≤ 11−αpib.
The proof of the above claim is extremely similar to the proofs of Claims A.3 and A.4, and
we do not explicitly prove it here as we do not really use the claim anywhere in the rest of
this proof. Instead, we will state and prove approximate versions of the above claim that we
will require later. These approximate versions shed additional light on some of the sufficient
conditions that a pricing solution must satisfy in order to capture social welfare via profit.
Claim B.3. 1. Suppose that (~p, ~x, ~y) is a pricing solution satisfying λi(xi) ≥ p˜ for every i,
and pt ≥ ct(yt) for all t ∈ T . Then,
SW (~p, ~x, ~y) ≤ [2( 1
1− α)
1
α − 1]pi(~p, ~x, ~y).
2. Suppose that ~x is a demand vector satisfying xi ≥ xbi for every i. Then,∑
i∈B
∫ x∗i
xi
λi(x)dx ≤ 1
1− α
∑
i∈B
λi(xi)xi.
Proof. (Statement 1):
The social welfare of (~p, ~x, ~y) is
∑
i∈B ui(xi)−C(~y). The function ui is concave for every i ∈ B,
and therefore ui(xi) ≤ u′i(0) · xi = λmaxxi. So, our first inequality is the following,
∑
i∈B
ui(xi)− C(~y) ≤
∑
i∈B
λmaxxi − C(~y) = λ
max
p˜
∑
i∈B
p˜xi − C(~y) = ( 1
1− α)
1
α
∑
i∈B
p˜xi − C(~y).
Now, the total profit that the seller makes at the given solution pi(~p, ~x, ~y) equals
∑
i∈B λi(xi)xi−
C(~y) ≥∑i∈B p˜xi−C(~y). Using this, we get the following upper bound for the ratio of the welfare
to profit ∑
i∈B ui(xi)− C(~y)
pi(~p, ~x, ~y)
≤ (
1
1−α)
1
α
∑
i∈B λi(xi)xi − C(~y)∑
i∈B λi(xi)xi − C(~y)
≤ (
1
1−α)
1
α
∑
i∈B λi(xi)xi − 12
∑
i∈B λi(xi)xi∑
i∈B λi(xi)xi − 12
∑
i∈B λi(xi)xi
= 2(
1
1− α)
1
α − 1.
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The second inequality above stems from Lemma C.3 in the Appendix, which states that
for any feasible pricing solution, C(~y) ≤ 12
∑
i∈B λi(xi)xi. This completes the proof of the first
statement.
Statement 2:
We need to prove an upper bound on the quantity
∑
i∈B
∫ x∗i
xi
λi(x)dx given the condition
that xi ≥ xbi for all i ∈ B. Since λi is an α-strongly regular function for all i, we can apply our
crucial Lemma D.2 to bound the integral as follows
∫ x∗i
xi
λi(x)dx ≤ 11−α( λi(xi)|λ′i(xi)|)(λi(xi)− λ(x
∗
i )).
Summming this up, one obtains,
∑
i∈B
∫ x∗i
xi
λi(x)dx ≤ 1
1− α
∑
i∈B′
λi(xi)
|λ′i(xi)|
(λi(xi)− λi(x∗i ))
≤ 1
1− α
∑
i∈B′
xiλi(xi).
In the above expression, B′ is the set of buyers for whom λi(xi) > λi(x∗i ). For the remaining
buyers, the integral is not positive and so we can safely ignore these terms. Further, since xi ≥ xbi ,
and λi(xi) > λi(x
∗
i ) for all i ∈ B′, it must be that λi(xbi) > λi(x∗i ), and so by definition of the
benchmark solution, we have that λ(xbi) = p˜. Thus, it is not hard to see that for every buyer
i ∈ B′, λi(xi) ≤ λi(xbi) = p˜ = λmax(1− α)
1
α , and so, as per Corollary D.5, λi(xi)/|λ′i(xi)| ≤ xi.
This completes the proof.
Augmented Walrasian Equilibrium with Dummy Prices
The most important notion in this proof is that of an augmented Walrasian equilibrium. At a
high level, the augmented equilibrium is a useful tool that allows us to approximate ‘personalized
payment’-based solutions via item pricing as long as the total price charged to different buyers
is correlated. For instance, in the benchmark solution, buyers are either charged p˜ or λi(x
∗
i ).
Definition Given an instance I = (B, T ), an augmented Walrasian equilibrium with dummy
price p is the social welfare maximizing allocation for an instance I+ = (B ∪B′, T ) where B, T
are as defined previously and B′ consists of |T | buyer types, one for each t ∈ T , such that the
buyer it corresponding to good t has only good t in her desired set of bundles (exactly one
bundle consisting of one item). Moreover, this buyer has a constant valuation λit(x) = p for
x ≤ L, where L is some sufficiently large population, and λit(x) = 0 for x > L.
One can imagine that each new buyer type has a virtually infinite population of buyers all
of whom desire one good and have the same valuation. Given I, p, an augmented Walrasian
equilibrium with this dummy price can be computed efficiently using the same convex program
as before.
Pricing Solutions Obtained via Augmented Equilibria Given a dummy price p, the
augmented equilibrium computation gives us a social welfare maximizing demand and allocation
vector ( ~xp, ~yp) for the corresponding instance I+. However, we are only interested in valid pricing
solutions for our original instance I. We now provide a simple transformation to convert ( ~xp, ~yp)
into a pricing solution (~p, ~x, ~y) for the original instance, which we will take for granted in the rest
of this work. Essentially, such a pricing solution is obtained by taking the augmented Walrasian
equilibrium, pricing each good at its marginal cost, and then removing all consumption due to
dummy buyers. Formally, define pt = ct(y
p
t ) for all t ∈ T , and for i ∈ B, xi = xpi . Finally, let
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these buyers consume the same bundles as in the augmented equilibrium, i.e., for every S ∈ Bi,
the amount of this bundle consumed by the buyer in (~p, ~x, ~y), xi(S) is the same as the amount
consumed by this buyer in the augmented equilibrium, xpi (S).
It is evident from the definition that (~p, ~x, ~y) is a valid pricing solution for our original instance
I. We first highlight some simple properties obeyed by such a pricing solution irrespective of
the exact dummy price and in the process, gain some understanding of the structure of these
solutions.
Lemma B.4. Given an instance and a dummy price pd, let (~p, ~x, ~y) denote the pricing solution
for the original instance obtained via the augmented Walrasian equilibrium with dummy price
pd. Then,
1. For every good t ∈ T , we have pt = max{pd, ct(yt)}.
2. The profit due to the solution pi(~p, ~x, ~y) ≥ C(~y).
Proof. Suppose that ( ~xpd , ~ypd) denotes the augmented Walrasian equilibrium with dummy price
pd. By construction, we know that for every t, pt = ct(y
pd
t ).
1. We first claim that for every good t, ct(y
pd
t ) ≥ pd. Indeed, if this condition were not met
for some t, then one could increase the social welfare of ( ~xpd , ~ypd) by simply allocating a
non-zero amount of good t to the dummy buyer assigned to that good it violating the fact
that ( ~xpd , ~ypd) is a social welfare maximizing allocation. Therefore for every t, it is true
that pt = ct(y
pd
t ) ≥ pd.
Since buyers are using the same bundles as in the augmented equilibrium, the consumption
of any good in ~y cannot be larger than its consumption in ~ypd , i.e., for all t ∈ T , yt ≤ yp
d
t .
This implies that pt = ct(y
pd
t ) ≥ ct(yt).
Now consider some good t for which pt > p
d. We claim that no dummy buyer can
be consuming this good in the augmented equilibrium. Once again, we show this via
contradiction. Assume to the contrary: then, one could increase the social welfare of
( ~xpd , ~ypd) by removing a non-zero amount of the allocation given to dummy buyer it,
which violates the optimality of the solution. This means that the entire consumption of
good t comes from the original buyers in B, and therefore, yt = y
pd
t . This in turn implies
that ct(yt) = pt.
2. We have already showed that for all t, pt ≥ ct(yt). Therefore, the second statement is a
consequence of Lemma C.3.
Saturated Goods Perhaps, the most useful feature of pricing solutions obtained via augmented
equilibria is highlighted in the second statement of the above lemma. Any good that is not
priced at the dummy price is in a sense saturated as pt = ct(yt). We refer to such goods having
pd < pt = ct(yt) as saturated goods. Saturated goods usually yield good profit (due to high
consumption) and thus, are useful in bounding the social welfare in terms of profit. As we will
show later, for a suitably chosen dummy price, any welfare lost from the benchmark solution
can be charged to the income obtained only from these saturated goods.
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First shot at an actual dummy price
Now that we have a better understanding of pricing solutions obtained via augmented equilibria,
we pose our first major question: can we effectively approximate the benchmark solution using a
carefully chosen dummy price? Our journey towards answering the above question begins with
the answer to a slightly relaxed question: what is the highest possible dummy price so that
resulting solution has a social welfare comparable to that of the benchmark solution? Clearly, if
the dummy price is small enough, one can recover the original optimum solution. The insistence
on high prices is to ensure that each buyer’s demand in the augmented equilibria is somewhat
comparable to λi(x
b
i). The following three claims shed some light on this question, by identifying
p˜
2`max as the appropriate dummy price. At this dummy price, we show that any deviation from
the benchmark solution can be charged to the revenue provided by the saturated goods (and so
the deviation cannot be too large). Recall that `max is the size of the largest bundle desired by
any buyer type.
Lemma B.5. Suppose that ( ~xa, ~ya) is any given benchmark solution, satisfying λi(x
a
i ) ≥ pˆ > 0
for all i ∈ B. Let (~p, ~x, ~y) denote a pricing solution for the original instance obtained via
an augmented Walrasian equilibrium with dummy price pˆ2`max . Then, for any buyer i having
λi(xi) > λi(x
a
i ), and every bundle S desired by i (S ∈ Bi), we have that,
• S contains at least one saturated good.
• λi(xi) ≤ 2
∑
t∈S∩Sˆ pt, where Sˆ is the set of saturated goods in (~p, ~x, ~y).
Proof. The first part of the lemma follows from simple contradiction. Consider a buyer i and
bundle S ∈ Bi as mentioned in the statement of the lemma, and suppose that S does not
contain any saturated good. Therefore, as per Lemma B.4, it must be true that for every t ∈ S,
pt =
pˆ
2`max . But since we have a valid pricing solution, it is also true that λi(xi) ≤
∑
t∈S pt. So,
we have that
pˆ ≤ λi(xai ) < λi(xi) ≤
∑
t∈S
pt = |S| pˆ
2`max
≤ pˆ
2
,
which is a contradiction. Note that |S| ≤ `max, by definition.
Now that we have established that S contains at least one saturated good, we can write
λi(xi) as,
λi(xi) ≤
∑
t∈S∩Sˆ
pt +
∑
t∈S\(S∩Sˆ)
pt ≤
∑
t∈S∩Sˆ
pt +
pˆ
2
.
Since λi(xi) ≥ pˆ, we get the desired lemma (second statement).
Building on the previous lemma, we actually bound the welfare loss from the benchmark
solution in terms of the income (profit without the cost) due to the saturated goods in (~p, ~x, ~y)
as well as (~p∗, ~x∗, ~y∗). The introduction of OPTW here may appear strange at first but we
remind the reader that bounding social welfare in terms of the profit at OPTW does not really
hurt us by much as a high profit at OPTW leads to a trivial bicriteria approximation algorithm
with optimal welfare.
Lemma B.6. Suppose that ( ~xa, ~ya) is any given benchmark solution and (~p, ~x, ~y) denotes a
pricing solution for the original instance obtained via an augmented Walrasian equilibrium with
dummy price pˆ2`max . Also, suppose that the following conditions are satisfied
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1. λi(x
a
i ) ≥ pˆ for all i ∈ B.
2. ~x∗ ≥ ~xa and ~y∗ ≥ ~ya.
Let Bˆ be the set of buyers for whom λi(xi) > λi(x
a
i ). If Sˆ denotes the set of saturated goods
in (~p, ~x, ~y), then,
∑
i∈Bˆ
∫ xai
xi
λi(x)dx ≤
∑
i∈Bˆ
λi(xi)x
a
i ≤ 2
∑
t∈Sˆ
ptyt + 2
∑
t∈Sˆ
p∗t y
∗
t
Proof. Suppose that xai (S) is the amount of bundle S consumed by buyer i in the benchmark
solution. Then, we have that ∑
i∈Bˆ
λi(xi)x
a
i =
∑
i∈Bˆ
∑
S∈Bi
λi(xi)x
a
i (S).
Moreover, we know that for every S ∈ Bi, λi(xi) ≤ 2
∑
t∈S∩Sˆ pt, from Lemma B.5. Using
this upper bound, we get∑
i∈Bˆ
λi(xi)x
a
i ≤
∑
i∈Bˆ
∑
S∈Bi
∑
t∈S∩Sˆ
2ptx
a
i (S) ≤ 2
∑
t∈Sˆ
pty
a
t .
Now, we divide the goods in Sˆ into two categories: set Sˆa represents the goods for which
yt ≥ yat , and the rest of the goods fall under Sˆ∗. Moreover, for every good t ∈ Sˆ∗, ct(y∗t ) ≥
ct(y
a
t ) ≥ ct(yt) = pt. Using this, we can proceed with our final simplification.
2
∑
t∈Sˆ
pty
a
t ≤ 2
∑
t∈Sˆa
pty
a
t + 2
∑
t∈Sˆ∗
pty
a
t ≤ 2
∑
t∈Sˆa
ptyt + 2
∑
t∈Sˆ∗
p∗t y
∗
t .
Since Sˆ∗, Sˆa ⊆ Sˆ, we have our lemma.
With our properties of augmented Walrasian equilibrium solutions firmly in place, we are
now ready to prove our first crucial claim, a lower bound for the social welfare of the solution
(~p, ~x, ~y) obtained via an augmented equilibrium in terms of the optimum welfare as well as the
profit at (~p, ~x, ~y) as well as at OPTW . Assuming for the time being that the profit at OPTW is
not that large, the claim below gives us a handle on a (high enough) dummy price for which our
solution behaves like the benchmark solution. This dummy price will be the starting point, from
which we design a sequence of solutions to extract good profit. If the current dummy price was
much smaller (say), then we would still be guaranteed a good social welfare but unfortunately,
good profit becomes an arduous task.
Claim B.7 (Claim 5.2 from Section 5). Suppose that (~p, ~x, ~y) denotes a pricing solution for
the original instance obtained via an augmented Walrasian equilibrium with dummy price p˜2`max .
Then,
SW ∗ − SW (~p, ~x, ~y) ≤
(
5 +
6
1− α
)
[pi(~p, ~x, ~y) + pi(~p∗, ~x∗, ~y∗)].
Recall that p˜ = λmax(1− α) 1α .
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Proof. Consider SW ∗ − SW (~p, ~x, ~y); this can be expressed as follows,
SW ∗ − SW (~p, ~x, ~y) =
∑
i∈B
∫ x∗i
xi
λi(x)dx− (C( ~y∗)− C(~y)).
Recall our original benchmark solution (~xb, ~yb). Divide B into two subsets: Bˆ denotes the
set of buyers for whom λi(xi) > λi(x
b
i) and B \ Bˆ denotes the other buyers. We now further
simplify the above equation,
∑
i∈B
∫ x∗i
xi
λi(x)dx =
∑
i∈Bˆ
∫ x∗i
xi
λi(x)dx+
∑
i∈B\Bˆ
∫ x∗i
xi
λi(x)dx
=
∑
i∈Bˆ
∫ xbi
xi
λi(x)dx+ [
∑
i∈Bˆ
∫ x∗i
xbi
λi(x)dx+
∑
i∈B\Bˆ
∫ x∗i
xi
λi(x)dx]
≤
∑
i∈Bˆ
∫ xbi
xi
λi(x)dx+
1
1− α [
∑
i∈Bˆ
xbiλi(x
b
i) +
∑
i∈B\Bˆ
xiλi(xi)]
≤
(
1 +
1
1− α
)∑
i∈Bˆ
λi(xi)x
b
i +
1
1− α
∑
i∈B\Bˆ
xiλi(xi).
The bound for the term in the square parentheses in lines two and three comes from the
second half of Lemma B.3 for which we define a new demand vector ~x′ such that x′i = max(x
b
i , xi).
The last line follows from simple rearrangement. The benchmark solution satisfies all of the
conditions mentioned in Lemma B.6 and therefore, the first term above
∑
i∈Bˆ λi(xi)x
b
i is no
larger than 2
∑
t∈Sˆ ptyt+2
∑
t∈Sˆ p
∗
t y
∗
t . Once again, Sˆ is the set of saturated goods in our pricing
solution.
In summary, we get
∑
i∈B
∫ x∗i
xi
λi(x)dx ≤
(
2 +
3
1− α
)∑
i∈B
[λi(xi)xi + λi(x
∗
i )x
∗
i ].
Coming back to our original expression, the difference in social welfare can be written as
SW ∗ − SW (~p, ~x, ~y) ≤
(
2 +
3
1− α
)∑
i∈B
[λi(xi)xi + λi(x
∗
i )x
∗
i ] + C(~y)
≤
(
4 +
6
1− α
)
[pi(~p, ~x, ~y) + pi(~p∗, ~x∗, ~y∗)] + pi(~p, ~x, ~y).
The last step comes from Lemma C.3.
Penultimate Leg: Sequence of Solutions
Previously, we identified a suitable dummy price and proved that the solution obtained via the
augmented equilibrium at this dummy price (to some extent) captures all of the welfare of the
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benchmark solution and any lost welfare can be charged to the saturated goods. What about the
profit of this solution? When all of the bundles desired by buyers are of equal cardinality, one
can immediately show that the solution’s profit also mimics that of the personalized payment
scheme in the benchmark solution, pib. When there is large disparity in the bundle sizes, however,
the dummy price may result in buyers gravitating towards the smaller sized bundles. How do
we fix this?
In this subsection, we consider augmented Walrasian equilibria at dummy prices that are
scaled versions of the original dummy price p˜2`max . Sequentially, we show that, if the profit at
the previous solution (starting with the original dummy price) does not meet our requirement,
then scaling the dummy price by a factor of two, does not really lead to a large loss in social
welfare. Once again, our primary technique is a charging argument that assigns the lost welfare
to the profit of the saturated goods. The profit due to the saturated goods is no larger than the
social welfare of the solution, and thus, in either event, the social welfare cannot be small.
We begin with some notation. Consider the vector of prices defined as P (j) = 2j p˜2`max for
j = 0 up to j = dlog(∆)e+1, and define (~p(j), ~x(j), ~y(j)) to be the pricing solution for the original
instance obtained via the augmented Walrasian equilibrium at dummy price P (j). While below
we assume that ∆ is a power of 2, this argument is easily generalized. Let us also define SW (j)
and pi(j) to be the social welfare and profit of the pricing solution (~p(j), ~x(j), ~y(j)). Observe that
(~p(0), ~x(0), ~y(0)) denotes the solution with the original dummy price for whose social welfare we
obtained a bound in Claim 5.2.
Our next claim establishes a bound on the loss in social welfare as we increase the dummy
price, in terms of the the previous and the current profit. For the rest of this proof, we define
δ := log2(∆).
Claim B.8 (Claim 5.3 from Section 5). For every j ∈ [0, δ], SW (j) − SW (j + 1) ≤ 3pi(j) +
3pi(j + 1).
Proof. Consider SW (j)− SW (j + 1), this can be bound as follows,
SW (j)− SW (j + 1) ≤
∑
i∈B
λi(xi(j + 1))xi(j)− (C(~y(j))− C(~y(j + 1)).
Let us divide B into two groups of buyers: B1, which are the buyers satisfying λi(xi(j+1)) ≤
2λi(xi(j)) and B2 which represent the buyers for whom λi has more than doubled. Our proof
will proceed by charging the loss in welfare for the buyers in B1 to pi(j); for the buyers in B2,
the loss in welfare will be charged to both pi(j) as well as the income/revenue from the saturated
goods in pi(j + 1). In fact, we are only interested in a special class of saturated goods, for
which ct(yt(j + 1)) ≥ ct(yt(j)). Formally, define SS(j + 1) as the subset of saturated goods in
(~p(j + 1), ~x(j + 1), ~y(j + 1)) having ct(yt(j + 1)) ≥ ct(yt(j)).
We first state a simple sub-claim, which we prove later.
Lemma B.9. For every buyer i ∈ B2, and any bundle S ∈ Bi that i consumes a non-zero
amount of in (~p(j), ~x(j), ~y(j)), we have that λi(xi(j+ 1))− 2λi(xi(j)) ≤
∑
t∈SS(j+1)∩S pt(j+ 1).
Now, we are ready to proceed with the proof. Let us divide
∑
i∈B λi(xi(j+ 1))xi(j) into two
parts, namely (i):
∑
i∈B1 λi(xi(j + 1))xi(j) +
∑
i∈B2 2λi(xi(j))xi(j), and (ii):
∑
i∈B2 [λi(xi(j +
1))− 2λi(xi(j))]xi(j). Consider the first part,∑
i∈B1
λi(xi(j + 1))xi(j) +
∑
i∈B2
2λi(xi(j))xi(j) ≤ 2
∑
i∈B
λi(xi(j))xi(j).
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We proceed with the second part carefully. Consider the solution (~p(j), ~x(j), ~y(j)), and
define zi(S) to be the amount of bundle S consumed by buyer i in this solution. Without loss
of generality, assume that Bi consists only of bundles that i is consuming non-zero amounts of
in (~p(j), ~x(j), ~y(j)). Applying our Sub-Lemma B.9, we get that,
∑
i∈B2
[λi(xi(j + 1))− 2λi(xi(j))]xi(j) ≤
∑
i∈B2
∑
S∈Bi
[λi(xi(j + 1))− 2λi(xi(j))]zi(S).
≤
∑
i∈B2
∑
S∈Bi
∑
t∈SS(j+1)∩S
pt(j + 1)zi(S).
≤
∑
t∈SS(j+1)
pt(j + 1)yt(j)
≤
∑
t∈SS(j+1)
pt(j + 1)yt(j + 1).
Finishing up the proof, we have that
SW (j)− SW (j + 1) ≤ 2
∑
i∈B
λi(xi(j))xi(j)− C(~y(j)) +
∑
t∈T
pt(j + 1)yt(j + 1) + C(~y(j + 1))
= pi(j) +
∑
i∈B
λi(xi(j))xi(j) +
∑
t∈T
pt(j + 1)yt(j + 1) + C(~y(j + 1))
≤ 3pi(j) + 3pi(j + 1).
As usual, we replace the income with the profit as per Lemma C.3. Recall that
∑
t∈T pt(j +
1)yt(j + 1) =
∑
i∈B λi(xi(j + 1))xi(j + 1).
Proof of Lemma B.9
We need to prove that for every buyer i ∈ B2, and any bundle S ∈ Bi that i consumes a non-zero
amount of in (~p(j), ~x(j), ~y(j)),
λi(xi(j + 1))− 2λi(xi(j)) ≤
∑
t∈SS(j+1)∩S
pt(j + 1).
Consider the items in S \SS(j+1). Since λi(xi(j+1)) =
∑
t∈S pt(j+1) because i consumes
a non-zero amount of bundle S, then in order to prove the lemma, it suffices to show that∑
i∈S\SS(j+1)
pt(j + 1) ≤ 2
∑
t∈S\SS(j+1)
pt(j) ≤ 2
∑
t∈S
pt(j) = 2λi(xi(j)).
We claim that for every t ∈ S \SS(j+ 1), pt(j+ 1) ≤ 2pt(j). To see why this is true, assume
by contradiction that pt has more than doubled for some good t ∈ S \ SS(j + 1). Clearly, this
good must be saturated in (~p(j+ 1), ~x(j+ 1), ~y(j+ 1)) since the dummy price has only doubled,
and ct(yt(j + 1) ≥ 2ct(yt(j)). However, saturated goods which have ct(yt(j + 1) ≥ ct(yt(j))
belong to SS(j + 1) by definition.
31
Since we can bound the difference in welfare via profit, we can sequentially build solutions
with good social welfare until we either reach a solution with good profit (in which case, we are
done) or j = 1 + δ is reached, and we have no more solutions to construct. In order to analyze
the boundary condition, we now establish upper bounds on the social welfare at j = 1 + δ in
terms of the profit obtained at that solution.
Lemma B.10.
SW (δ + 1) ≤
(
2(
1
1− α)
1
α − 1
)
pi(δ + 1).
Proof. Consider the pricing solution (~p(δ + 1), ~x(δ + 1), ~y(δ + 1)): this corresponds to an aug-
mented Walrasian equilibrium with dummy price 2δ+1 p˜2`max =
p˜
`min
, where `min ≥ 1 is the
cardinality of the smallest bundle desired by any one buyer type.
Applying Lemma B.4, we know that for every t ∈ T , pt ≥ p˜`min . Therefore, we have that for
every buyer i ∈ B, λi(xi(δ + 1)) ≥ p˜`min |S|, for any S ∈ Bi. Since |S| ≥ `min, we conclude that
λi(xi(δ + 1)) ≥ p˜. Applying Claim B.3 on (~p(δ + 1), ~x(δ + 1), ~y(δ + 1)) completes the proof.
Now, we are ready to combine all of the above claims and lemmas to make our final stand: a
bound on SW ∗ in terms of the profits of various solutions, which would imply that the max-profit
solution approximates the optimum welfare up to the desired bound. In the next subsection, we
take this proof further and show that if the max-profit solution from the below claim does not
result in a good welfare, then one can in fact identify another such solution with similar profit
guarantees but much better welfare.
Claim B.11 (Claim 5.4 from Section 5).
SW ∗ ≤
(
8 + 2(
1
1− α)
1
α + 4
1
1− α
)
[
1+δ∑
j=0
pi(j) + pi(~p∗, ~x∗, ~y∗)].
Proof. We know from Claim 5.2 that
SW ∗ − SW (0) ≤
(
5 +
6
1− α
)
[pi(0) + pi(~p∗, ~x∗, ~y∗)].
Our other crucial result, Claim 5.3 tells us that for any j,
SW (j)− SW (j + 1) ≤ 3pi(j) + 3pi(j + 1).
Writing the above inequality for all j ∈ [0, δ] provides us with a nice telescoping summation,
which upon addition with the first inequality above yields
SW ∗ ≤ SW (δ + 1) +
δ∑
j=1
6pi(j) + 3pi(δ + 1) +
(
8 +
6
1− α
)
[pi(0) + pi(~p∗, ~x∗, ~y∗)].
Finally, by replacing SW (δ + 1) with the bound obtained in Lemma B.10, we can wrap up
the claim,
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SW ∗ ≤ (2 + 2( 1
1− α)
1
α )pi(δ + 1) + 6
δ∑
j=1
pi(j) +
(
8 +
6
1− α
)
[pi(0) + pi(~p∗, ~x∗, ~y∗)]
≤
(
8 + 2(
1
1− α)
1
α +
4
1− α
)
[
δ+1∑
j=0
pi(j) + pi(~p∗, ~x∗, ~y∗)]
For the second inequality, we used the fact that 2 11−α ≤ 2( 11−α)
1
α .
Final Pricing Algorithm
We have all of the required lemmas in our arsenal, and now will go about deriving our final
algorithm. In the statement of Claim 5.4, there are 2+log(∆) profit terms in the RHS; therefore,
the solution giving maximum profit among pi(0), pi(1), . . . , pi(δ + 1) and pi(~p∗, ~x∗, ~y∗) must yield
a (2 + log(∆))Θ( 11−α) approximation to both profit and welfare. Our proof does not end here
as our desired social welfare bound does not depend on ∆, but by choosing the maximum profit
solution, we may end up with a O(log(∆)) additional welfare degradation on our hands.
However, we show that by using some careful analysis, one can instead compute a solution
whose approximation for social welfare is simply O( 11−α) and thus, is independent of ∆. We
now define our main algorithm: for the purpose of continuity, let pi(−1) represent pi(~p∗, ~x∗, ~y∗).
1. Let k be the smallest index in the range [−1, 1 + δ] such that SW ∗pi(k) is no larger than
2(log(∆) + 2){
(
8 + 2( 11−α)
1
α + 4 11−α
)
}.
2. Return the solution (~p(k), ~x(k), ~y(k)).
From Claim 5.4, it is clear that there exists at least one index k providing the desired
guarantee. In fact, if k = −1, then we are done because the solution returned is the one
maximizing social welfare. The following claim provides a lower bound on the social welfare
SW (k) when k ≥ 0.
Claim B.12. The algorithm provides a (Θ( log ∆1−α ),Θ(
1
1−α))-bicriteria approximation to revenue
and welfare.
Proof. The revenue bound simply follows from the algorithm, so we focus on the social welfare
here. Recall from Claim 5.2 that (i)SW ∗ ≤ SW (0) +
(
5 + 61−α
)
(pi(−1) + pi(0)).
Moreover, applying Lemma 5.3 repeatedly for j = 0 to k and performing the telescoping
summation, we get that (ii) : SW (0)− SW (k) ≤ 3pi(0) + 6∑k−1j=1 pi(j) + 3pi(k).
We use the above inequalities to derive a lower bound on SW (k). We prove this in two cases,
Case I: k = 0
SW ∗ ≤ SW (0) +
(
5 +
6
1− α
)
(pi(−1) + pi(0))
=⇒ SW
∗
2
≤ 6
(
1 +
1
1− α
)
SW (0).
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Clearly pi(−1)(5 + 61−α) ≤ pi(−1)(8 + 41−α + 2( 11−α)
1
α ) ≤ SW ∗2 as per the definition of the
algorithm since k 6= −1. Moreover, we also used the trivial inequality that pi(0) ≤ SW (0). In
conclusion, we have that SW (k) = SW (0) is a Θ( 11−α)-approximation to the optimum welfare.
Case II: k > 0.
We add up the inequalities (i) and (ii) from above to get
SW ∗ ≤ SW (k) + 3pi(k) + (8 + 6
1− α)
k−1∑
j=−1
pi(j)
≤ SW (k) + 3pi(k) + SW
∗
2
≤ 4SW (k) + SW
∗
2
=⇒ SW
∗
2
≤ 4SW (k).
The second inequality is a consequence of the fact that for every j ∈ [−1, k − 1], SW ∗ ≥
2(log(∆) + 2){
(
8 + 2( 11−α)
1
α + 4 11−α
)
pi(j). We add this inequality for j = −1 to k − 1, which
consists of at most k + 1 ≤ log(∆) + 2 terms.
So, the worst welfare is obtained for k = 0.
C Appendix: Cost functions
The first two lemmas below are paraphrased versions of similar results in [3].
Lemma C.1. Consider two pricing solutions (~p1, ~x1, ~y1) and (~p2, ~x2, ~y2) such that ~p1 ≥ ~p2,
and suppose that ~y1, ~y2 are the minimum-cost allocations for the buyer demands ~x1 and ~x2
respectively over all feasible allocations. Then,
1. ~x2 ≥ ~x1, i.e, every buyer type’s demand is higher under ~p2 than under ~p1.
2. For all t ∈ S, ct(y1t ) ≤ ct(y2t ).
3. For every buyer i, ri(~z1) ≤ ri(~z2).
Lemma C.2. Consider two buyer demands ~x1 and ~x2 where ~x2 ≥ ~x1 and the corresponding
min-cost allocations are ~z1 and ~z2. Then, the following provides a bound for the difference in
costs ∑
t∈T
(Ct(z
2
t )− Ct(z1t )) ≥
∑
i∈B
ri(~z1)(x
2
i − x1i ).
Lemma C.3. Let (~p, ~x, ~y) denote a valid pricing solution for a given instance such that for all
t, pt ≥ ct(yt). Then
1.
∑
i∈B λi(xi)xi ≥ 2C(~y).
2. pi(~p, ~x, ~y) ≥ C(~y).
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3.
∑
i∈B λi(xi)xi ≤ 2pi(~p, ~x, ~y).
Proof. The proof follows from the nature of doubly convex cost functions. Double convexity
implies that for every t ∈ T , Ct(yt) ≤ 12ct(yt)yt. Therefore, we have that
C(~y) ≤ 1
2
∑
t∈T
ct(yt)yt ≤ 1
2
∑
t∈T
ptyt =
1
2
∑
i∈B
λi(xi)xi.
The final part of the above inequality comes from rearranging the allocation from the goods
to the buyers, along with an application of the fact that for any buyer type i with non-zero
consumption of bundle S, λi(xi) =
∑
t∈S pt.
The second statement follows directly from the first since pi(~p, ~x, ~y) =
∑
i∈B λi(xi)xi−C(~y).
The third statement follows from the second.
D Appendix: Basic Properties of α-SR functions
Lemma D.1. Let f(x) be any non-increasing, non-negative α-Strongly regular function. Then
for any constant c, f(x)− c is also α-strongly regular in the interval where it is non-negative.
Proof. We need to prove that for any x1 < x2,
f(x2)−c
|f ′(x2)| −
f(x1)−c
|f ′(x1)| ≤ α(x2 − x1). We show this in
two cases.
Case I: |f ′(x1)| ≥ |f ′(x2)|
When both of the derivatives are non-zero, we have that
f(x2)− c
|f ′(x2)| −
f(x1)− c
|f ′(x1)| = {
f(x2)
|f ′(x2)| −
f(x1)
|f ′(x1)|} − c(
1
|f ′(x2)| −
1
|f ′(x2)|).
Since the function f is α-SR, the first quantity in the RHS is smaller than or equal to α(x2−x1)
the second quantity is not positive as per the assumption for Case I. The lemma follows. Note
that if any one of the two derivatives are zero, then the proof follows trivially.
Case II: |f ′(x1)| < |f ′(x2)|
In this case,
f(x2)− c
|f ′(x2)| ≤
f(x2)− c
|f ′(x1)| ≤
f(x1)− c
|f ′(x1)| .
The final inequality follows from the fact that the function f is monotone non-increasing. There-
fore, f(x2)−c|f ′(x2)| −
f(x1)−c
|f ′(x1)| ≤ 0 ≤ α(x2 − x1).
Lemma D.2. Let f(x) be any non-increasing, non-negative α-Strongly regular function. Then
for any x2 ≥ x1, the following inequality is true,∫ x2
x1
f(x)dx ≤ 1
1− α
f(x1)
|f ′(x1)|(f(x1)− f(x2)).
Proof. Consider any x ≥ x1. We now use the definition of α-strong regularity to obtain a crude
upper bound on f(x) in terms of f(x1) and the derivative at x. i.e., we know that
f(x)
|f ′(x)| ≤
f(x1)
|f ′(x1)| + α(x− x1).
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For convenience, define h = f(x1)|f ′(x1)| . This gives us the following upper bound, f(x) ≤
h|f ′(x)| + α|f ′(x)|(x − x1). The quantity we wish to compute is
∫ x2
x1
f(x)dx. Using our upper
bound from before, we have that∫ x2
x=x1
f(x)dx ≤ h
∫ x2
x=x1
|f ′(x)|dx+ α
∫ x2
x=x1
(x− x1)|f ′(x)|dx.
Recall that since f is non-increasing |f ′(x)| = −f ′(x). Moreover, for the second integral,
we can simply integrate by parts and get that
∫ x2
x1
(x − x1)(−f ′(x))dx = [(x − x1)(−f(x))]x2x1 −∫ x2
x=x1
(−f(x))dx = −(x2 − x1)f(x2) +
∫ x2
x=x1
f(x). Combining the various pieces, we are now
ready to complete the proof∫ x2
x1
f(x)dx ≤ h(f(x1)− f(x2))− α(x2 − x1)f(x2) + α
∫ x2
x=x1
f(x)dx
=⇒ (1− α)
∫ x2
x1
f(x)dx ≤ h(f(x1)− f(x2))− α(x2 − x1)f(x2)
≤ h(f(x1)− f(x2)).
Lemma D.3. Let f(x) be a non-increasing, non-negative α-Strongly regular function and let x1
be any point satisfying f(x1)|f ′(x1)| ≤ x1. Then for every x ≥ x1, the following inequality holds,
f(x)
|f ′(x)| ≤ x.
Proof. The proof follows almost directly from the definition of an α-SR function. Since x ≥ x1,
we have that
f(x)
|f ′(x)| ≤
f(x1)
|f ′(x1)| + α(x− x1) ≤ x1 + α(x− x1) ≤ (1− α)x1 + αx.
Since x1 ≤ x, we have that (1− α)x1 + αx ≤ x. This completes the proof.
Lemma D.4. Let f(x) be a non-increasing, non-negative α-Strongly regular function, and let
x1 be any point satisfying
f(x1)
|f ′(x1)| > x1. Then,
f(0) < f(x1)(
1
1− α)
1/α.
Notice that since f is non-increasing, f(0) is the maximum value of the function.
Proof. Consider the function g(x) = log(f(x)). Differentiating this gives us,
g′(x) =
f ′(x)
f(x)
.
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Recall that since f(x) is non-increasing, its derivative cannot be positive. Integrating g′(x) from
x1 to 0 gives us ∫ 0
x1
g′(x) =
∫ 0
x1
f ′(x)
f(x)
dx
g(0)− g(x1) =−
∫ 0
x1
|f ′(x)|
f(x)
dx
log
f(0)
f(x1)
=
∫ x1
0
|f ′(x)|
f(x)
dx
Now, since the function is α-SR and x ≤ x1, we have that f(x)|f ′(x)| ≥ f(x1)|f ′(x1)| − α(x1 − x).
The first quantity in RHS is at least x1 from the lemma statement, and therefore, we get
f(x)
|f ′(x)| > x1(1− α) + αx. Substituting this in the above integral, we get∫ x1
0
|f ′(x)|
f(x)
dx <
∫ x1
0
1
x1(1− α) + αxdx =
1
α
log(
1
1− α).
Therefore, we get that log f(0)f(x1) <
1
α log(
1
1−α), giving us the upper bound of (
1
1−α)
1
α for
f(0)
f(x1)
.
The following corollary that follows from the previous lemma is perhaps the most important
ingredient required for our main theorem.
Corollary D.5. Let f(x) be a non-increasing, non-negative α-Strongly regular function and x1
be some point satisfying f(0) ≥ ( 11−α)
1
α f(x1). Then,
f(x1)
|f ′(x1)| ≤ x1.
Proof. Assume by contradiction that f(x1)|f ′(x1)| > x1. Then as per Lemma D.4, it must be true
that f(0) < f(x1)(
1
1−α)
1
α , which of course contradicts the corollary statement.
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